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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Despite the pendency of a case in state court on the 
same issues, the District Court granted a declaratory 
judgment in favor of an insurance carrier on a coverage 
case based solely on state law. We conclude that in the 
circumstances, the District Court should have declined to 
exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will vacate the 
judgment and direct that the complaint be dismissed. 
 
Underlying this controversy is a suit for damages brought 
on behalf of Bryant Dixon, a child who allegedly was 
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poisoned by lead paint in his home, a structur e owned and 
leased by E & J Rentals. Dixon's complaint against E & J 
was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania on March 12, 1999. After r eceiving 
notice of the impending suit, E & J notified State Auto 
Insurance Co., its liability carrier, of the claim. State Auto 
advised E & J that the policy's pollution exclusion applied 
to preclude coverage and, consequently, E & J would have 
no insurance protection against the Dixon claim. 
 
On March 23, 1999, E & J's attorney sent a letter to 
State Auto, disagreeing with its denial of coverage and 
advising that he intended to ask for a declaratory judgment 
in state court to resolve the matter. State Auto responded 
by filing the present declaratory judgment action in the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
April 7, 1999. 
 
On June 11, 1999, E & J moved to dismiss or stay the 
federal action, arguing that the court should, in its 
discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. 
Three days later, E & J filed its own suit for declaratory 
judgment in state court. State Auto moved to dismiss the 
state suit; both parties filed motions for summary judgment 
in the two courts. After briefing that vigor ously contested 
jurisdiction, the District Court denied E & J's motion to 
dismiss or stay on August 25, 1999 without stating its 
reasons for doing so. 
 
On January 28, 2000, the District Court granted State 
Auto's motion for summary judgment.1 E & J has appealed, 
challenging the decision of the District Court to adjudicate 
the declaratory judgment. E & J also argues the merits of 
the coverage issue. 
 
Generally speaking, insurance companies include 
pollution exclusions in their liability policies to shield 
themselves from claims for injuries caused by exposure to 
harmful substances, irritants, contaminants, or chemicals 
as defined more precisely in the policies. The interpretation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On February 10, 2000, based on res judicata, the state trial court 
denied E & J's motion for summary judgment in its declaratory 
judgment action. 
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of these clauses, particularly in lead poisoning cases 
similar to Dixon's, has resulted in extensive litigation in 
state and federal courts throughout the country. No 
consensus on the interpretation and scope of the 
exclusionary clauses has emerged among courts nationally, 
nor in Pennsylvania, whose law applies here. 
 
At the time the District Court denied E & J's motion to 
dismiss, only two Pennsylvania trial courts had ruled on 
this issue. See Fayette County Hous. Auth. v. Housing & 
Redev. Ins. Exch., No. 2440-1997, slip op. (C. P . Fayette Co. 
(Pa.) Apr. 7, 1999); Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, No. 1044- 
1997, slip op. (C. P. Lancaster (Pa.) Apr . 17, 1998). Both 
courts held that pollution exclusion clauses similar to the 
one at issue here were ambiguous, and ther efore the 
insurers were required to defend and indemnify the insured 
property owners. 
 
In the interim between the District Court's denial of E & 
J's motion to dismiss and the grant of summary judgment 
for State Auto, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a 2-1 
decision, reversed the order of the Court of Common Pleas 
of Lancaster County, and ruled in favor of the insur er. Lititz 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, 746 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super . 1999). The 
policyholders in Lititz have since petitioned the state 
supreme court for allocatur. 
 
The other Common Pleas case, Fayette County Housing 
Authority, also came before the Superior Court. Rather than 
following Lititz, the Superior Court sua sponte ordered 
rehearing en banc of the decision fr om the Court of 
Common Pleas of Fayette County. Fayette County Hous. 
Auth. v. Housing & Redev. Ins. Exch., No. 693-WDA-99, 
Order (Pa. Super. Ct. March 9, 2000). The case was argued 
in September 2000. 
 
United States District Courts within this cir cuit also have 
examined the pollution exclusion's application to lead 
poisoning cases, with varying results.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The following cases held that pollution exclusions applied to preclude 
coverage: St. Leger v. American Fire and Cas. Co., 870 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994), aff'd w/o opinion, 61 F .3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995); Kaytes v. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 97-3225, 1997 WL 763022 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 
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I. 
 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2201 and 
2202, provides a remedy that may be used by the federal 
courts in appropriate circumstances. This statute provides 
that a court "may declare the rights. . . of any interested 
party," 28 U.S.C. S 2201(a) (emphasis added), and 
contemplates that district courts will exercise discretion in 
determining whether to entertain such actions. 
 
The unique characteristics of the Act werefirst made 
clear by the Supreme Court in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance 
Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942), a case involving 
a dispute between insurance carriers. The Court 
emphasized that the jurisdiction conferred by the Act was 
discretionary, and district courts were under no compulsion 
to exercise it. Id. at 494. 
 
       "Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as 
       vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory 
       judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state 
       court presenting the same issues, not gover ned by 
       federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous 
       interference with the orderly and comprehensive 
       disposition of a state court litigation should be 
       avoided." 
 
Id. at 495. 
 
After articulating the rationale, the Court listed specific 
factors for district judges to consider in deciding whether to 
hear declaratory judgment actions. A critical question, 
according to the Court, was "whether the questions in 
controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and 
which [were] not foreclosed under the applicable 
substantive law, can better be settled in the pr oceeding 
pending in the state court." Id. Naturally, this requires 
some inquiry into the scope of the state court pr oceeding, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1997); Kaytes v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., No. 93-1573, 1994 WL 
78090 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1994). Contra Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Fair, No. 
96-1975 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1997) (holding that pollution exclusion was 
ambiguous and that insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify 
insured.). 
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the nature of defenses available there, and whether the 
claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be 
adjudicated in that proceeding. Id.; see also Edwin 
Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for 
Declaratory Judgments, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 677 (1942) 
(observing that district courts are not obliged to exercise 
jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions and concluding 
that refusal to exercise jurisdiction is proper where issues 
before state and federal courts are substantially the same 
and entertaining action would only duplicate judicial effort). 
 
The discretionary nature of the declaratory judgment 
remedy became somewhat clouded after Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. United States , 424 U.S. 800 
(1976). There, the Court proclaimed that federal courts 
have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the 
jurisdiction conferred on them by Congr ess. Id. at 817. 
 
Although Colorado River was an abstention case involving 
federal claims, some courts applied its restrictive teachings 
to limit or abolish the discretion to deny declaratory 
judgments. See, e.g., Terra Nova Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 900 Bar, 
Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1221 (3d Cir . 1989) (listing cases in 
which Colorado River test was applied in declaratory 
judgment context). Notably, in Terra Nova , this Court 
disagreed with that approach. Id. at 1222. After exploring 
the ramifications of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 
(1983) (holding that a district court may not grant a stay 
pending arbitration absent exceptional circumstances), we 
concluded that neither case diminished the jurisdictional 
discretion contained in the Declaratory Judgment Act, and 
that Brillhart retained its vitality. Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 
1223. 
 
Because of lingering confusion among the courts over 
whether Colorado River eroded Brillhart, the Supreme Court 
revisited the issue in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 
277, 279, 281 (1995). Reviewing the declaratory judgment 
remedy at some length, the Court reaffir med Brillhart's 
standard of broad discretion and r ejected Colorado River's 
restrictive "exceptional circumstances" test as inappropriate 
for the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at 286. As Wilton 
phrased it, "[i]n the declaratory judgment context, the 
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normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate 
claims within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of 
practicality and wise judicial administration." Id. at 288. 
The statute "confers a discretion on the courts rather than 
an absolute right upon the litigant." Id. at 287. 
 
Wilton's emphasis upon "practicality" and "wise judicial 
administration" echoes Brillhart's specific admonition: "It is 
not our function to find our way through a maze of local 
statutes and decisions on so technical and specialized a 
subject [matter] . . . . For one thing, it is too easy to lose 
our way." Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497. The Court concluded 
that district court decisions should be reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard in actions for "declaratory 
relief where parallel proceedings, pr esenting opportunity for 
ventilation of the same state law issues, wer e underway in 
the state court." Id. at 290.3  
 
Two years after Terra Nova, in United States v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of 
Environmental Resources, 923 F .2d 1071, 1075 (3d Cir. 
1991), we applied a limiting factor from Brillhart to draw a 
distinction between declaratory judgment actions that 
district courts should entertain, and those in which 
jurisdiction ought to be declined. We concluded that the 
District Court did not have open-ended discr etion to decline 
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action when the 
issues included federal statutory interpretation, the 
government's choice of a federal forum, an issue of 
sovereign immunity, or inadequacy of the state proceeding. 
Id. at 1076-79. That case was quite differ ent from Brillhart, 
where the declaratory judgment action was r estricted to 
issues of state law. 
 
For cases like Brillhart, where district courts must decide 
whether to hear declaratory judgment actions involving 
insurance coverage issues, we have suggested r elevant 
considerations: 
 
       1. A general policy of restraint when the same issues 
       are pending in a state court; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have applied Wilton's standard of discretion to interpleader actions 
as well. See NY Life Distributors, Inc. v. Adher ence Group, Inc., 72 F.3d 
371 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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       2. An inherent conflict of interest between an 
       insurer's duty to defend in a state court and its 
       attempt to characterize that suit in federal court as 
       falling within the scope of a policy exclusion; 
 
       3. Avoidance of duplicative litigation. 
 
Department of Environmental Resour ces, 923 F.2d at 1075- 
76 (discussing Terra Nova).4  
 
These precedents counsel hesitation by federal courts in 
exercising jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions 
when the state law involved is close or unsettled. See 
Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that where there seemed to be equally relevant 
statements by the state courts on either side of the issue, 
it would be prudent to leave the question to be decided in 
the state proceeding).5 A federal court should also decline to 
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction when doing so would 
promote judicial economy by avoiding duplicative and 
piecemeal litigation. See id. at 239 (noting that "the 
prospects for coordinated management and alleviation of 
abrasion are greater when the litigation is handled under 
one jurisdictional roof."). Moreover , district courts should 
give serious consideration to the fact that they do not 
establish state law, but are limited to pr edicting it. This is 
especially important in insurance coverage cases, although 
we do not mean to confine its relevance to that category. 
 
In diversity matters, the federal courts are often called 
upon to apply state law without the guidance of state 
appellate rulings. To aid in the correct disposition of such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Kiewit Eastern Co., Inc. v. L & R Construc. Co., Inc., 44 F.3d 1194, 
1198 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) the Court noted the discretionary factor in 
declaratory judgment actions, but proceeded on the merits because none 
of the parties contested that issue. Similarly in Nationwide Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998) and Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Buffetta, No. 99-1832, 2000 WL 1573085 (3d 
Cir. 2000), apparently the parties neither cited Wilton nor contested 
jurisdiction. 
 
5. In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Cassel, 881 F. Supp. 133, 
136 (M.D. Pa. 1994), the court declined to exer cise jurisdiction where 
the 
claim presented "a novel, and hence, unsettled issue of state law which 
the state courts should address." 
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cases, some courts have adopted the practice of certifying 
questions of law to the state's highest court. This practice 
has been encouraged and utilized by the United States 
Supreme Court. This Court has also used this pr ocedure 
and found it to be a great benefit. W e recognize the 
necessity of restraint, however, so that we do not 
overburden the already crowded dockets of the state 
appellate courts with too many certifications. 
 
"[I]n declaratory judgment actions Congr ess has afforded 
the federal courts a freedom not present in ordinary 
diversity suits to consider the state interest in having the 
state courts determine questions of state law." Mitcheson, 
955 F.3d at 238. Consequently, it is counterproductive for 
a district court to entertain jurisdiction over a declaratory 
judgment action that implicates unsettled questions of state 
law, questions which might otherwise be candidates for 
certification to the state's highest court. Such matters 
should proceed in normal fashion thr ough the state court 
system. See id. at 240 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The [state] interests 
assume greater saliency where, as her e, the issues of state 
law are close."); see also Meritcar e, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury 
Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 225 n.7 (3d Cir . 1999). In short, 
where the applicable state law is uncertain or 
undetermined, district courts should be particularly 
reluctant to entertain declaratory judgment actions. 
 
II. 
 
Clearly, the case at hand falls outside the ar ea outlined 
by Brillhart and Wilton as appr opriate for the District Court 
to exercise its jurisdiction. At the time the court denied E 
& J's motion to dismiss, Dixon's personal injury suit and E 
& J's petition for declaratory judgment were both pending 
in state court before the same judge, who was presumably 
already familiar with the insurance policy and with the 
scientific evidence available on lead paint poisoning. 
Judicial efficiency was not promoted when the District 
Court also considered this evidence, as it inevitably had to 
when deciding the federal declaratory judgment action.6 If 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In McDowell Oil Service, Inc. v. Interstate Fire and Casualty Co., 817 
F. 
Supp. 538, 546 (M.D. Pa. 1993), a district judge noted that it would be 
inefficient for a federal court to decide a declaratory judgment action 
that 
would turn on the assessment of scientific data when the state court 
judge in the underlying tort action was already familiar with this data. 
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the District Court had not interfered, the state court would 
have been able to develop a coordinated schedule of briefing 
and discovery that would have promoted the efficient 
resolution of both the declaratory judgment action and the 
underlying tort action, thereby conserving judicial 
resources as well as those of the parties. 
 
Not only were there strong factors militating against the 
exercise of jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment 
action, but no federal interests were pr omoted by deciding 
this case in the District Court. Not a single federal question 
was presented to the District Court by State Auto. As noted 
earlier, two trial court decisions, but no appellate cases, 
were in existence in the state system, a forum that was 
fully able and prepared to resolve this purely state law 
issue. Entertainment of a federal declaratory judgment suit 
in these circumstances fits Brillhart's description of a 
"vexatious" and "gratuitous interfer ence" with state court 
litigation. 
 
It is irrelevant that the state declaratory judgment 
petition was filed after its counterpart in the District Court. 
Moreover, E & J's vigorous objection to the District Court's 
assumption of jurisdiction should have weighed in favor of 
refusing to entertain the action. Even in the absence of 
such a challenge, however, the circumstances presented 
here would readily have supported a decision to decline 
jurisdiction sua sponte. 
 
In order to maintain the proper relationship between 
federal and state courts, it is important that district courts 
"step back" and allow the state courts the opportunity to 
resolve unsettled state law matters. As W ilton reminded us, 
the Declaratory Judgment Act confers a discr etion on the 
courts rather than an absolute right on litigants. Wilton, 
515 U.S. at 287. It follows that the state's inter est in 
resolving its own law must not be given short shrift simply 
because one party or, indeed, both parties, perceive some 
advantage in the federal forum. When the state law is firmly 
established, there would seem to be even less r eason for the 
parties to resort to the federal courts. Unusual 
circumstances may occasionally justify such action, but 
declaratory judgments in such cases should be rar e. 
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We appreciate the efforts of the able and conscientious 
district judge in this case to expedite the disposition of 
litigation assigned to him, but as we have mentioned, other 
overriding considerations come into play. Decisions in 
declaratory judgment actions must yield to "considerations 
of practicality and wise judicial administration." Wilton, 515 
U.S. at 288. The desire of insurance companies and their 
insureds to receive declarations in federal court on matters 
of purely state law has no special call on the federal forum. 
 
Whether declaratory relief should be granted"will depend 
upon a circumspect sense of its fitness infor med by the 
teachings and experience concerning the functions and 
extent of federal judicial power." Id . at 287. We conclude 
that the assumption of jurisdiction under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act in this case was not consistent with a sound 
exercise of discretion. 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint. 
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